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Abstract 
This essay examines the rise of legal cosmopolitanism in the period since the UDHR of 1948 as it 
gives rise to two very distinct sets of literature and preoccupations.  I contrast the mainly negative 
conclusions drawn by conventional political theory about the possibility of reconciling democratic 
sovereignty with a transnational legal order to the utopianism of contemporary legal scholarship that 
projects varieties of global constitutionalism with or without the state. 
I argue that transnational human rights norms strengthen rather than weaken democratic 
sovereignty.  Distinguishing between a ‘concept’ and a ‘conception’ of human rights, I claim that self-
government in a free public sphere and free civil society is essential to the concretization of the 
necessarily abstract norms of human rights.  My thesis is that without the right to self-government, 
which is exercised through proper legal and political channels, we cannot justify the range of 
variation in the content of basic human rights as being legitimate. I name processes through which 
rights-norms are contextualized in polities ‘democratic iterations.’ 
The institutionalization of human rights norms through democratic iterations that permit their 
revision, rearticulation and contestation, both within judicial institutions and in the larger spheres of 
civil society,  exhibits certain ‘epistemic virtues’ and shows, in Allen Buchanan’s words, ‘public 
practical reason’ at work.   
In conclusion, in addition to Buchanan’s thesis, I consider Anne-Marie Slaughter’s concept of 
‘transjudicial communication,’ and Judith Resnik’s model of ‘law by affiliation’.  These three models, 
like ‘democratic iterations,’ develop modalities of thinking beyond the binarism of the cosmopolitan 
versus the civic republican; democratic versus the international and transnational; democratic 
sovereignty versus human rights law.   
Keywords 
Legal cosmopolitanism; transnational legal order; human rights law; democratic iterations; democratic 
sovereignty. 
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I. The Resurgence of Cosmopolitanism 
The last two decades have seen a revival of interest in cosmopolitanism across a wide variety of fields, 
ranging from law to cultural studies, from philosophy to international politics, and even to city 
planning and urban studies.1 How do we account for this?  Undoubtedly, the most important reasons 
for this shift in our sensibilities and cognitions are the epoch-making transformations referred to as 
‘globalization’ and the end of the ‘Westphalian-Keynesian-Fordist’ paradigm by many;2 as the spread 
of neo-liberal capitalism by some; and as the rise of multiculturalism and the displacement of the West 
by the ‘rest’ by others.  Cosmopolitanism has become a place-holder for thinking beyond the 
confusing present towards a possible and viable future. 
Legal developments are at the forefront of these transformations.  It is now widely accepted 
that since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, we have entered a phase in the 
evolution of global civil society which is characterized by a transition from international to 
cosmopolitan norms of justice.  While norms of international law emerge either through what is 
recognized as customary international law or through treaty obligations to which states and their 
representatives are signatories, cosmopolitan norms accrue to individuals considered as moral and 
legal persons in a world-wide civil society.  By ‘cosmopolitanism’ I have in mind both a moral and a 
legal proposition: morally, the cosmopolitan tradition is committed to viewing each individual as 
equally entitled to moral respect and concern; legally, cosmopolitanism considers each individual as a 
legal person entitled to the protection of their human rights in virtue of their moral personality and not 
on account of their citizenship or other membership status.  Even if cosmopolitan norms also originate 
through treaty-like obligations, such as the UN Charter, the UDHR and various human rights 
covenants, their peculiarity is that they bind signatory states and their representatives to treat their 
citizens and residents in accordance with certain norms, even when states later wish, as is often the 
case, to engage in actions which contradict these terms and violate the obligations generated by these 
                                                     
1 Seyla Benhabib, Dignity in Adversity. Human Rights in Troubled Times (Cambridge, UK and Cambridge, MA; Polity Press, 
2011), pp. 1-20; Cf. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, eds. Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Pheng Cheah, Inhuman Conditions. On Cosmopolitanism and 
Human Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); for philosophy cf. the debate started by the volume 
For Love of Country? Debating the Limits of Patriotism, ed. by Joshua Cohen and Martha Nussbaum (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1996) and  Nussbaum’s well-known essay in this volume, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism”, pp. 3-17; but see 
Nussbaum’s later retractions, in: 137 Daedalus 3 (Summer 2008). Cf. Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism. Ethics in a 
World of Strangers (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2006); Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and 
Sovereignty,” 103 Ethics 1 (October 1992): 48-75; Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan 
Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2002); Stan van Hooft, Cosmopolitanism. A Philosophy for Global 
Ethics (Montreal and Kingston: McGill- Queen’s University Press, 2009).  For the pioneering work in political theory 
and international relations cf. Daniel Archibugi, David Held and Martin Kohler, Re-Imagining Political Community. 
Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); David Held, Democracy and the 
Global Order (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); Daniel Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens. 
Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); for urban studies, Leonie Sandercock, 
Cosmopolis II. Mongrel, Cities in the 21st Century (London: Continuum, 2003). 
2 For a recent lucid statement of the end of the ‘Westphalian-Keynesian-Fordist’ paradigm, see Nancy Fraser, Scales of 
Justice. Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 1 -30. 
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treaties themselves. This is the uniqueness of the many human rights covenants concluded since 
WWII: through them sovereign states undertake the ‘self-limitation’ of their own prerogatives.   
The best known of the  human rights agreements which have been signed by a majority of the 
world’s states since the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) are as follows:3 the 
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by 
Resolution 260 (III) A of the UN General Assembly on December 9 1948 (Chapter II); the 1951 
Convention on Refugees (which entered into force in 1954);4 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR; signed in 1966 and entered into force in 1976, with 167 countries out of 195 
being party to it as of 2012)5;  the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR; entered into force the same year and with 160 member parties as of 2012);6  the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW; signed in 1979 and 
entered into force in 1981, with 99 signatories and 187 state parties as of 2012); 7  the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (entry into force on March 12, 
1969, with 86 signatories and 175 parties as of 2012);8 the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (entry into force June 26, 1987, with 78 
signatories and 150 parties as of 2012).9 These are some of the best known among many other treaties 
and conventions. 
 
2. The Skeptical Objection 
The skeptic will ask: but what does all this really mean? What possible significance can these 
multilateral human rights covenants and developments in ‘humanity’s law’10 have, if states 
continuously and brazenly violate them and manipulate them to serve their own ends? Are they not 
mere words at worst or aspirational ideals at best that have little traction in influencing and limiting 
state conduct?  Do these developments add up to a novel, enforceable and justiciable legal world 
order?  Doesn’t the process of formulating RUDs – reservations, understandings and declarations – 
                                                     
3 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [ hereinafter, “UDHR”]. 
4 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A. res. 429 (V) (entered into force April 22, 1954). [hereinafter, “1951 
Convention.”] 
5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. 
Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.), referred to as “ICCPR”] . 
6 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR Supp (No. 16) at 
49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter, “ICESCR”]. 
7 The Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 
34/180, Dec. 18, 1979 (entered into force, Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter, “CEDAW”.] 
8 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, General Assembly Resolution 2106 
(XX),  Dec. 21,  1965. 
9 Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Resolution 39/46, Dec. 
10, 1984. 
10 Ruti Teitel, Humanity’s Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
The Future of Democractic Sovereignty and Transnational Law 
3 
take the bite out of the human rights treaties and make them merely convenient smoke-screens for 
states to hide behind? 
While skeptical doubts about state behavior and an international state-system that remains 
beset by violence, civil wars and proxy wars cannot be set aside, I remain convinced that something 
has changed profoundly in the grammar and syntax of the language of international law, sovereignty 
and human rights.11  Just as repeated use may imperceptibly change grammar and syntax in a language 
– consider for example, the frequent use of contractions such as “he’s” for “he is” in English – legal 
practice, institutionalization and adjudication may change legal doctrine.  In an earlier work, I 
described such processes of transformation in the international domain through the use of another 
metaphor: we are like travelers navigating a new terrain with the help of old maps; while the terrain 
has radically changed our maps have not. Thus, we stumble upon streams we did not know existed, 
and we have to climb hills we had never dreamt of.12 
Mirroring these imperceptible but cumulative transformations of the last three decades, the 
status of international law and of transnational legal agreements and treaties with respect to the 
sovereignty claims of liberal democracies has become a highly contentious theoretical and political 
issue.  Deep divergences have emerged among democracies normally considered allies.  While 
Europe, under the impact of the cumulative jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, the 
European Court of Human Rights, and strong constitutional courts such as the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, has moved towards a cosmopolitan order of strong rights-protection and 
increasing harmonization of domestic laws with the UDHR and other international treaties,13 a strong 
isolationist current has become powerfully visible in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
At least two different controversies have dominated recent discussions.  First, what is the 
status of foreign law, including the law of other nations and international treaties in constitutional and 
statutory adjudication?  As we know, great variations across countries exist in this regard: while 
international law becomes part of the valid constitutional order in many countries of the world such as 
The Netherlands and South Africa (referred to as constitutional monism), other constitutions are 
dualist with respect to treaty-based international law, and require various forms of treaty-ratification 
before these can become part of the law of the land.   
                                                     
11 See Teitel (Humanity’s Law, pp. 7) for an exploration of these themes in the domains of the law of war, international 
human rights law, and international criminal justice.  
12 S. Benhabib, The Rights of Others. Aliens, Residents and Citizens. The John Seeley Lectures (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), p. 6. 
13 Alec Stone Sweet, “A Cosmopolitan legal order: Constitutional Pluralism and rights adjudication in Europe,” 1 Global 
Constitutionalism 1 (2012), pp. 53-90. 
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A second controversy concerns whether recent developments in legal doctrine and practice 
can be seen as leading toward ‘global constitutionalism,’ with or without the state.14  Global 
constitutionalists point to increasing cooperation among constitutional court justices across the globe; 
their learning from one another and increasingly, their citing one another in considering similar cases, 
not as precedent but as significant evidence.  Even some scholars, such as Jeremy Waldron, who find 
the concept of ‘global constitutionalism’ exaggerated, nonetheless argue that there is increasing 
convergence around a ‘law for all nations.’15 
Others who defend constitutionalization without the state, such as Gunther Teubner, single out 
the spread of norms of lex mercatoria, and many other “lex’s,” such as lex sportiva, to argue that 
processes of norm-hierarchization, coordination and cooperation beyond the purview of states have 
evolved into a self-regulating system.16 Why shouldn’t a system that exhibits so many features of 
constitutionalism also be honored with that title? 
Surveying the legal writing of the last two decades on constitutionalization with or without the 
state, global constitutionalism, legal pluralism, constitutional pluralism, juridification or 
constitutionalization in the world-society etc.,  I have the impression that law and legal scholarship 
today, much as they helped to consolidate the gains of the interstate Westphalian peace of 1648 by 
providing the philosophical and jurisprudential bases of liberal bourgeois revolutions in the 18th 
century, are anticipating a world that is yet to be born, “une vérité à faire.”17  Legal scholarship has 
become a constitutive element in a new world that is yet to come, but which we, as contemporaries, 
can only grasp with the help of various metaphors.  
                                                     
14 Among the literature discussing ‘world  constitutionalization,’ See Bardo Fassbender, “The United Nations Charter as 
Constitution of the International Community,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 3 (1998); B. Fassbender, “ ‘We 
the Peoples of the United Nations’: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form,” in: The Paradox of Constitutionalism, 
M. Loughlin and N. Walker, eds. (2007) ; Arnim von Bogdandy, “Constitutionalism in International Law: Comment on a 
Proposal from Germany,” 47 Harvard International Law Journal (2006), pp. 223-242;  Brun-Otto Bryde, 
“Konstitutionalisierung des Voelkerrechts und Internationalisierung des Verfassungsbegriffs,” in: Der Staat 1 (2003), pp. 
61-75; Hauke Brunkhorst, “Globalizing Democracy without a State: Weak Public, Strong Public, Global 
Constitutionalism,” 31 Millenium: Journal of International Studies 3 (2002), pp. 675-690. For historical antecedents cf. 
Hans Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveraenitaet und die Theorie des Voelkerrechts. Beitrag zu Einer reinen Rechtslehre 
(Vienna: Scientia Allen, [1928], 1960); Alfred Verdross, Die Verfassung der Voelkerrechtsgemeinschaft (Vienna, 1926).  
There are parallel discussions concerning constitutionalization in the EU; in the WTO and the IMF etc.  See Alec Stone 
Sweet, “Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes” 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 2 
(2009), pp. 621 ff.  
15 Jeremy Waldron, Partly Laws Common to all Mankind: Foreign Law in American Courts, Storrs Lectures, Yale University 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012); Cf. also Jeremy Waldron, “The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Comment: 
Foreign Law and the Modern Jus Gentium,” 119 Harvard Law Review 129 (2005). 
16 For the first position see Gunther Teubner, “Global Bukovina,” in Global Law Without a State, G. Teubner, ed. (Aldershot 
and Brookfield, Vermont: Dartmouth Publishing Com., 1997), pp. 3-28; Gunther Teubner, “Societal Constitutionalism: 
Alternatives to State-Centered Constitutional Theory,” in: Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism, ed. 
Christian Joerges, I. J. Sand and G. Teubner (Oxford: Hart Publishers, 2004), pp. 3-29.  
17 See Jean L. Cohen, “Constitutionalism Beyond the State: Myth or Necessity? (A Pluralist Approach),” 2 Humanity 1 
(Spring 2011), pp. 127-158; here,  p. 128. 
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By contrast, political science has lost its privileged object domain, namely the state and inter-
state relations.  This observation pertains both to Realists who take the unitary state as the principal 
actor for all reflection and investigation, and to Liberal Internationalists who have a more pluralist 
vision of the state and who analyze state behavior differently.  Whether we think that states behave as 
self-interested principals only, or as agents and principals that are susceptible to normative and value 
considerations and are not guided by strategic self-interest alone, the unit we are looking at remains 
the same: the state and its institutions.  Whereas the new legal scholarship has ‘disaggregated’ this 
unit, political science – with few exceptions – has not yet taken note of these transformations. 
My own questions are related to, but distinct, from all these issues.  I am interested in legal 
cosmopolitanism, as it bears on the moral individual as a legal person in the international community, 
and I wish to examine the alleged conflict between one class of international legal norms in particular, 
namely those pertaining to human rights, broadly understood, and democratic sovereignty. I will argue 
that transnational human rights norms strengthen rather than weaken democratic sovereignty.  
Distinguishing between a ‘concept’ and a ‘conception’ of human rights, I claim that self-government 
in a free public sphere and free civil society is essential to the concretization of the necessarily abstract 
norms of human rights.  My thesis is that without the right to self-government, which is exercised 
through proper legal and political channels, we cannot justify the range of variation in the content of 
basic human rights as being legitimate. I name such processes ‘democratic iterations.’ 
The institutionalization of human rights norms through democratic iterations that permit their 
revision, rearticulation and contestation, both within judicial institutions and in the larger spheres of 
civil society,  exhibits certain ‘epistemic virtues,’ and shows, in Allen Buchanan’s words,  ‘public 
practical reason’ at work.   
In conclusion, in addition to Buchanan’s thesis, I consider Anne-Marie Slaughter’s concept of 
‘transjudicial communication,’ and Judith Resnik’s model of ‘law by affiliation’.  These three models, 
like ‘democratic iterations,’ develop modalities of thinking beyond the binarism of the cosmopolitan 
versus the civic republican; democratic versus the international and transnational; democratic 
sovereignty versus human rights law.   
 
3. Robert Dahl on Democracy and Skepticism Toward International Institutions 
Let us begin by considering the prevalent view in political science that democracy and transnational 
institutions and transnational law18 are incompatible. In his highly influential article, “Can 
                                                     
18 I am using the term ‘transnational law’ in the sense described by Harold Koh, “Transnational Legal Process,” in: 75 
Nebraska Law Review, pp. 181-208, and Harold Koh, “Transnational Public Law Litigation,” in: 100 Yale Law Journal, 
pp. 2347-2402. 
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international organizations be democratic? A skeptic’s view,”19 Robert Dahl’s crisp answer is: “an 
international organization is not and probably cannot be democratic.”20  Dahl argues that the most 
important aspects of democracy are that it is a “system of popular control over governmental policies 
and decisions,” and that is “a system of fundamental rights.”21  Viewed thus, democracy consists “of 
rule by the people, or rather the demos, with a government of the state that is responsive and 
accountable to the demos, a sovereign authority that decides important political matters either directly 
in popular assemblies or indirectly through representatives…”22 
Having established these non-controversial features of democracies, Dahl then states his main 
argument: “In democratic countries where democratic institutions and practices have long been well 
established and where, as best we can tell, a fairly strong democratic political culture exists, it is 
notoriously difficult for citizens to exercise effective control over many key decisions on foreign 
affairs. What grounds have we for thinking, then, that citizens in different countries engaged in 
international systems can ever attain the degree of influence and control over decisions they now 
exercise within their own countries?”23 Dahl’s skeptical answer emphasizes (i) epistemic limits, (ii) 
cultural diversity, and (iii) procedural factors as deterrents to citizens being able to exercise such 
control.   
Ad. i. Since international matters are infinitely complex, they are beyond the judgment of the 
average citizen and are often handled by experts.  But, we may ask, is it more difficult to understand 
why the spread of AIDS in Africa needs to be stopped than to decipher the US Federal tax code?  Isn’t 
the epistemic argument of complexity a matter of degree rather than of kind? 
Ad. ii. For Dahl, when a democratic unit is enlarged to include new territory and people, “the 
demos is likely to become more heterogeneous.”24  Diversity increases the possible cleavages over 
socio-economic and political interests, as well as over cultural, national and religious identity, and this, 
in turn, makes it more difficult for citizens to understand the situation, needs, conditions, and aims of 
“distant others.”25  However, in complex modern societies whose population is becoming rapidly 
reconfigured under conditions of global economic migrations, cultural and scientific exchanges and 
world-wide travel, isn’t the demos quite “non-homogeneous” already?   Doesn’t Dahl’s conception of 
the citizens’ perceptions of their own interests and identities seriously underestimate the deep 
                                                     
19 In: Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon, eds., Democracy’s Edges (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), pp. 19-36. 
20 Ibid., p. 19. 
21 Ibid., p. 20. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., p. 23. 
24 Ibid., p. 26. 
25 Ibid. 
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diasporic attachments and multiple identities that citizens may feel with subnational as well as 
transnational groups? Again, is this a matter of degree or of kind? 
Ad. iii. The proper criterion for government decisions is the public good. But Dahl sees both 
substantive and procedural hurdles to realize this in international organizations. Substantive hurdles 
concern the divergence of interests and identities. Procedurally, the public good is as contested in 
international matters as in domestic ones, yet the weight of elite consensus on international matters 
means that the views and interests of the majority of citizens would not be represented.  But don’t 
similar trends exist in domestic politics as well, and furthermore, why couldn’t procedural reform and 
institutional tinkering lead to better representation of interests and a more affective articulation of the 
good of all those affected in international institutions as well? 
In sum: Dahl’s answer that not only international organizations, but international institutions 
and processes as well, cannot be democratic, is based upon the model of a conventionally state-
centered and homogeneous demos with very clear lines demarcating the inside from the outside, 
domestic from foreign politics.26  Dahl concedes that sometimes citizens can become sufficiently 
galvanized such that foreign affairs are seen along more of a continuum with domestic ones and this 
can cause their passions to enflame.  He also observes that “international organizations can help to 
expand human rights and the rule of law.”27 But in the final analysis, such institutions will remain 
“bureaucratic bargaining systems,” even if we need to develop democratic criteria to judge them. 
Dahl’s nation-state centric understanding of international organizations, institutions and 
processes is not adequate to account for the radical interdependence of states throughout the 
ecological, immunological, financial, banking, and many other global systems and networks in our 
days. Whereas historically, states could more or less hope to influence their external environment 
through their own actions and policy measures, today the scope and effectiveness of state action and 
capacity have been greatly reduced. States are one among many actors in transnational networks that 
they cannot control. The sovereign-debt crisis of the last years is the most vivid illustration of states’ 
dependence upon international organizations, networks, and processes, showing the degree to which 
Dahl’s boundary categories have become irrelevant.   
                                                     
26 All democracies presuppose a principle of membership according to which some are entitled to political voice while others 
are excluded.  The decision as to who is entitled to have political voice and who is not can only be reached, however, if 
some who are already members decide who is to be excluded and who is not.  This means that there can be no non-
circular manner of determining democratic membership. Robert Dahl had already observed that the problem of how to 
legitimately make up the people had been neglected by all major democratic theorists.  See Robert Dahl, Democracy and 
its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 119-131; Robert Dahl, After the Revolution (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1970), pp. 59-63.  For an attempt to ameliorate Dahl’s paradox, see S. Benhabib, “Democratic 
Exclusions and Democratic Iterations: Dilemmas of Just Membership and Prospects of Cosmopolitan Federalism,” in: 
Dignity in Adversity,  pp. 138-166.  
27 R. Dahl (1999), p. 32. 
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There are three positions within contemporary social science that provide us with a different 
assessment of the relationship of democracies to international institutions.  I will name these “the 
transformation of sovereignty thesis” (TOS); the thesis that “democracies need international 
institutions” (DNII); and the thesis that “international institutions strengthen human rights (IIHR).” 
Saskia Sassen, one of the most prominent defenders of the TOS thesis,28 notes that the 
national and the transnational are not binaries; they interpenetrate; the national tries to structure the 
transnational and the transnational is both enframed by and simultaneously pushes up against the 
limits of the national. Relations with other demoi are no longer intermittent and episodic but 
continuous and structural. “State sovereignty,” writes Sassen, “is usually understood as the State’s 
monopoly of authority over a particular territory, demarcated by reasonably established geographic 
borders. Today, it is becoming evident that even as national territories remain bound by traditional 
geographic borderlines, globalization is causing novel types of  ‘borderings’ to multiply…”29 Among 
those most significant novel ‘borderings’ are the ‘denationalization’ of what was once national. “[The] 
State,” adds Sassen, “plays an active role in this denationalizing, but this only becomes evident when 
we disaggregate ‘the’ State and examine the work of particular parts of the State: particular agencies, 
particular court decisions, particular executive conditions.  It also means that this denationalizing can 
coexist with traditional borders and with the ongoing role of the State in new global regimes.”30 
Whereas Sassen questions the sociological adequacy of the model of state sovereignty that 
underlines Dahl’s concept of democracy, in “Democracy Enhancing Multilaterism,” Robert O. 
Koehane, Stephen Macedo and Andrew Moravscik, argue “that participants in multilateral institutions 
– defined broadly to include international organizations, regimes and networks governed by formal 
international agreements, can enhance the quality of domestic democracy.”31 Defenders of the DNII 
thesis see this “democracy-enhancement” as occurring in three domains: they argue that membership 
in international organizations restricts the power of special interest groups within states in matters 
concerning the environment and global trade, for example.  Such membership can enhance the 
protection of minority rights either through treaty membership or by belonging to regional human 
rights regimes such as the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
African Charter of Human Rights and Duties, etc. Finally, they see such membership as enhancing the 
                                                     
28 In addition to Sassen’s work cited in footnote 29 below,  see Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (New 
York: Zone Books, 2010), and my essay “Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms,” in: 
Dignity in Adversity,  pp.94-117; J.G. Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations,” 47 International Organization 1 (1993), pp. 139-74. From a more jurisprudential point of view see Abram 
Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty. Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
29 Saskia Sassen, “Bordering Capabilities versus Borders: Implications for National Borders,” 30 Michigan Journal of 
International Law (2008-2009), pp. 567-597; here p. 567. See also S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From 
Medieval to Global Assemblages  (New Jersey and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
30 S. Sassen (2008-9), 569. 
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quality of democratic deliberation by “fostering collective deliberation in non-majoritarian 
institutions,” such as “courts, bureaucratic agencies, national executives and the military.”32  One of 
the most prominent examples of such a deliberation-enhancing, non-majoritarian institution is the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, formed under UN auspices in 1988.  Throughout, the 
authors’ strategy is to take issue with conceptions of direct deliberative democracy by arguing that just 
as constitutional democracy means that the people accept certain limits on their unbridled sovereignty 
so as to govern themselves democratically over the long-term (and not just on the basis of periodic 
majoritarian elections), so too, multilateral institutions and regimes can be seen as creating 
institutional and normative limitations on democratic majorities such as to enable better cooperation 
on a global scale.   
Beth Simmons’s recent work  supports the third thesis (IIHR), namely, that international 
institutions strengthen observance of, and respect for, human rights in non-democracies as well as 
democracies. Simmons has provided empirical case studies to analyze the impact of states’ 
ratifications of various human rights treaties on domestic adherence to human rights norms.  She 
observes that “the more interesting cases … are those in which governments ratify an international 
human rights agreement, yet make no move to implement or comply with it.  Why should a ratified 
treaty make a difference in such cases?”33 One reason may be that since treaties constitute law in some 
jurisdictions, they could strengthen civil rights litigation. Yet it is more challenging when ratified 
treaties enable citizens’ mobilization. Simmons focuses on “non-democratic” states to argue that 
“ratification injects a new model of rights into domestic discourse, potentially altering expectations of 
domestic groups and encouraging them to imagine themselves as entitled to forms of official 
respect.”34  Furthermore, “Treaties create additional political resources for pro-rights coalitions under 
these circumstances. They resonate well with an embryonic rule of law culture and gather support 
from groups that not only believe in the specific rights at stake, but also believe they must take a stand 
on rule-governed political behavior in general.”35 Simmons presents an analysis of the impact of the 
ICCPR on civil liberties and religious freedoms across several countries.  “These results suggest,” she 
writes, “a modest but important conclusion: international treaty commitments quite likely have made a 
positive contribution to civil rights practices in many countries around the world.”36 
(Contd.)                                                                  
31 In: International Organization 63 (Winter 2009), pp. 1-31; here p.1. 
32 Ibid., 18-9. 
33 See Beth Simmons, “Civil Rights in International Law: Compliance with Aspects of the “International Bill of Rights,” 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, vol. 16, No. 2 (Summer 2009), pp. 437-481, here p. 443. 
34 Ibid., p. 445. 
35 Ibid., p. 447. 
36 Ibid., p. 480.  For further research on the significance of treaty ratification for human rights’ observance and activism, see 
Margaret E. Kick and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Thomas 
Risse, Steven Rapp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change 
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In view of these perspectives, new questions suggest themselves: rather than being confined to 
the nation-centric demos, democracy itself may no longer be possible except as a project of state 
interdependence and global cooperation. Second, international organizations themselves need to be 
increasingly subject to multilateral criteria of democratic accountability and transparency, as Dahl 
himself also observes.  In fact, some of the literature on constitutionalization and human rights now 
focuses on WTO, IMF and various public administrative law regimes.37 
I want to integrate here legal scholars’ contributions to this debate with certain normative 
considerations on human rights and democratic theory.  I want to follow the DNII and IIHR theses 
presented above, by elucidating a more philosophical approach to the interdependence of democracy 
and human rights.  Human rights constitute the core of legal cosmopolitanism; without clarifying the 
relationship of human rights treaties and international practices to the institutions and practices of 
states, much talk about legal cosmopolitanism hangs in thin air. 
Christopher McCrudden observes that in considering the meaning and significance of national 
judges’ citation of judgments from other jurisdictions in cases with a significant human (or 
constitutional) rights aspect, three questions suggest themselves: “empirical questions (how far does it 
happen, and where?), jurisprudential questions (can we identify criteria that help explain why it does 
or does not happen), and normative questions (is it legitimate?).”38 McCrudden believes that the first 
two are “the most pressing, and probably the most difficult to resolve.”39  In this essay, I hope to 
contribute to a clarification of the third – the normative – problem by focusing on human rights and 
the democratic right to self-governance. 
 
4. Human Rights and Constitutional Rights 
There is wide-ranging disagreement among contemporary philosophers about the philosophical 
justification as well as the content of human rights.  Some argue that human rights constitute the “core 
of a universal thin morality,” (Michael Walzer), while others claim that they form “reasonable 
conditions of a world-political consensus,” (Martha Nussbaum). Still others narrow the concept of 
human rights “to a minimum standard of well-ordered political institutions for all peoples”(John 
(Contd.)                                                                  
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Beth Simmons Mobilizing for Human Rights. International Law in 
Domestic Politics, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
37 See Nico Krisch, “Global Administrative Law and the Constitutional Ambition,” in: The Twilight of Constitutionalism, ed. 
Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010),  pp. 245-267; Ann Peters, “Membership in 
the Global Constitutional Community,” sections on International Organizations and Business Actors, in: Jan Klabbers, 
Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), pp. 153-263 
38 Christopher McCrudden, “A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional 
Rights,” 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 4 (2000), pp. 499-532; here p. 499.  
39 Ibid., p. 532. 
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Rawls). 40  Allen Buchanan has observed, therefore, that there is a “justification deficit” in human 
rights discourse, characterized by the “disturbing fact that, while the global culture and 
institutionalization of human rights” has gained considerable traction, “the nature of the justification 
for claims about the existence of human rights remains obscure.”41 
Admittedly, the philosophical discussion of human rights and the conversation among 
lawyers, jurists, and legal scholars do not run in tandem, but the philosophical debate does raise a 
legitimate question about the relationship of human rights norms and constitutional rights. In this 
essay, I do not provide my preferred strategy of philosophical justification for human rights, which 
proceeds from the value and norm of communicative freedom. I have done so elsewhere.42 Briefly, in 
my view, human rights constitute a narrower group of claims than general moral rights; human rights 
bear on human dignity and equality; they are protective of the human status as such.  I agree with 
James Griffin that human rights do not exhaust the entirety of our conceptions of justice, let alone of 
morality.43  Human rights have their proper place in discourses of political legitimation.  Such 
discourses presuppose moral principles, in the sense that the justification of human rights always leads 
back to some moral principle and some vision of human agency.  Human rights are most central to a 
public vocabulary of political justice; they designate a special and narrow class of moral rights. 
Human rights covenants and declarations articulate general principles which need 
contextualization and specification in the form of legal norms.   How is this legal content to be 
shaped?  Basic human rights are rights that require justiciable form, i.e. rights that require embodiment 
and instantiation in a specific legal framework.  Human rights straddle that line between morality and 
legality; they enable us to judge the legitimacy of law.44   
It is important to consider Jurgen Habermas’s caveat about not making an all-too hasty a 
transition from human rights considered as moral principles to constitutional rights: “Hence we must 
not understand basic rights or Grundrechte, which take the shape of constitutional norms, as mere 
imitations of moral rights, and we must not take political autonomy to be a mere copy of moral 
                                                     
40 Michael Walzer, “Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad,” (Notre Dame, IN: University of  Notre Dame 
Press, 1994); Martha C. Nussbaum, “Capabilities and Human Rights,” in: Fordham Law Review (1997-98), vol. 66, No. 
273, pp. 273-300;  John Rawls, “The Law of Peoples,” [1993], in: J. Rawls, Collected Papers, ed. by Samuel Freeman 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 529-564; here p. 552.  There are interesting differences in 
formulation between this early article and Rawls’s later book The Law of Peoples.  See J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples 
with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1999). 
41 Allen Buchanan, “The Egalitarianism of Human Rights,” 120 Ethics (July 2010): 669-710; here, p. 679. 
42 See S. Benhabib, “Another Universalism. On the Unity and Diversity of Human Rights,” in: Dignity in Adversity, pp. 57-
77.  
43 James Griffin, “Human Rights: Questions of Aim and Approach,” in: 120 Ethics (July 2010), pp. 741-760; here p. 745. 
44 See the classical essay by Ronald Dworkin, “Taking Rights Seriously” (1970), in: Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 184ff. 
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autonomy. Rather, norms of action branch out into moral and legal rules.”45 Since even basic 
constitutional norms such as respect for the dignity of the person and equality need to be promulgated 
in accordance with a specific jurisdiction and in a specific time and place, they differ form moral 
norms which are valid for human beings at all times and places.  Moral principles, such as respect for 
human dignity and equality, do not dictate a specific constitutional content, but all constitutional basic 
norms entail certain moral principles of respect for persons, their equality and dignity. 
In negotiating the relationship between general human rights norms, as formulated in various 
human rights declarations, and their concretization in the multiple legal documents of various 
countries, we may invoke the distinction between a concept and a conception.46 We need to 
differentiate between moral concepts such as fairness, equality and liberty – let us say –  and 
conceptions of fairness, equality and liberty which would be attained as a result of introducing 
additional moral and political principles to supplement the original conception.47 Should justice be 
defined as “fairness” (Rawls) or as “from each according to his abilities to each according to his 
needs” (Marx)? To be able to argue for one or the other, we would need to introduce some further 
claims about scarcity, human needs and wants, the structure of the basic subject of justice and the like 
to supplement our original concept of justice. 
Applied to the question of how we move from general normative principles of human rights, 
as enshrined in the various covenants, to specific formulations of them as enacted in various legal 
documents, this would suggest the following: these documents formulate core concepts of human 
rights which would form part of any conception of valid constitutional rights.  How then is the 
legitimate range of rights to be determined across liberal democracies, or how can we transition from 
general concepts of rights to specific conceptions of them? Even as fundamental a principle as “the 
moral equality of  persons” assumes a justiciable meaning as a human right once it is posited and 
interpreted by a democratic law-giver.  And here a range of legitimate variations can always be the 
case.  For example, while equality before the law is a fundamental principle for all societies observing 
the rule of law, in many societies such as Canada, Israel and India, this is considered quite compatible 
with special immunities and entitlements which accrue to individuals in virtue of their belonging to 
different cultural, linguistic and religious groups.  For societies such as the United States and France, 
with their more universalistic understandings of citizenship, these multicultural arrangements would 
                                                     
45 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, translated by 
William Regh (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996), p. 107. 
46 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls invokes H.L. A. Hart’s discussion in The Concept of Law to introduce this distinction.  See 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), here p. 5 and H.L. A. Hart, The 
Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975 [1961]), pp. 155-159.  Many thanks to the late Ed Baker for clarifying 
some of the intertextual issues involved here. 
47 R. Dworkin, “Constitutional Cases,” in: Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 131-149; here pp. 134 ff. 
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be completely unacceptable.48  At the same time, in France and Germany, the norm of gender equality 
has led political parties to adopt various versions of the principle of “parité” – namely that women 
ought to hold public offices on a fifty-fifty basis with men, and that for electoral office, their names 
ought to be placed on party tickets on an equal footing with male candidates.  By contrast, within the 
United States, gender equality is protected by Title IX which applies only to major public institutions 
which receive federal funding.49 Political parties are excluded from this.   
James Nickel is one of the few authors who have noted the multiplicity of levels at which 
rights vocabulary can function and who have tried to explain the translation of the language of moral 
principle to that of justiciable rights claims.  Nickel writes: “The rights vocabulary can be used at any 
of these levels.  For example, one might talk at the grand level of the right to equal respect, at the 
middle levels of the constitutional right to due process, and at the application levels of a statutory right 
to have thirty days to prepare for a hearing. But the vocabulary of human rights is used most typically 
at the middle level – it is used by nations or international organizations to outline in broad but still 
fairly definite terms what grander principles of morality and justice require in one country or era.”50 
There is, in other words, a legitimate range of variation even in the interpretation and 
implementation of such a basic right as that of “equality before the law.”  But the legitimacy of this 
range of variation and interpretation is crucially dependent upon the principle of self-government.  My 
thesis is that without the right to self-government, which is exercised through proper legal and 
political channels, we cannot justify the range of variation in the content of basic human rights as 
being legitimate. Unless a people can exercise self-government through some form of democratic 
channels, the translation of human rights norms into justiciable legal claims in a polity cannot be 
actualized. So, the right to self-government is the condition for the possibility of the realization of a 
democratic schedule of rights.51 Just as without the actualization of human rights themselves, self-
                                                     
48 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture. Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton, N.J : Princeton University 
Press, 2002), pp. 154-168. 
49 Title IX, Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1972). 
50 James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights. Philosophical Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987),  p. 44. 
51 This strong thesis will provoke the objection that surely it is possible that a non-democratic regime, say a monarchy or 
some other form of benevolent authoritarianism, may be a form of “constitutional theocracy,” [see Ran Hirschl, 
Constitutional Theocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010) )], may respect human rights without  
accepting a human right to self-government.  John Rawls’ distinction between liberal democracies and decent-
hierarchical regimes in The Law of Peoples was based on this insight.  I am willing to bite the bullet here and argue that 
such a limitation of human rights to minimal protections of the person, the rule of law, and guarantees of civic peace and 
property are fundamentally incomplete.  Human rights cannot be separated from the right to self-government, because 
when they are, they no longer are “rights” but “privileges” granted to one by some higher authority.  The people can 
claim rights to be its own only when it can recognize itself, through the proper institutional channels, to be their author as 
well.  Certainly, stability, some respect for the rule of law and property relations, civic peace among competing ethnic 
and religious groups are politically valuable and the fact that many “decent-hierarchical” regimes may achieve them is 
not to be dismissed.  But they cannot satisfy a prime condition of political modernity which is that legitimacy originates 
with respect for the capacity of persons to be the sources of reasonable consent. See S. Benhabib, “Is There a Human 
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government cannot be meaningfully exercised, so too, without the right to self-government, human 
rights cannot be contextualized as justiciable entitlements. They are coeveal.  That is, the liberal 
defense of human rights as placing limits on the publicly justifiable exercise of power needs to be 
complemented by the civic-republican vision of rights as constituents of a people’s exercise of public 
autonomy.  Without the basic rights of the person, republican sovereignty would be blind; and without 
the exercise of collective autonomy, rights of the person would be empty.52  The concretization of 
human rights as justiciable entitlements take place in different venues through a multiplicity of 
institutional channels.  I have introduced the term ‘democratic iterations’ to characterize such 
processes. 
 
5. Democratic Iterations 
By democratic iterations I mean complex processes of public argument, deliberation and exchange 
through which universalist rights claims are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, 
posited and positioned throughout legal and political institutions as well as in the associations of civil 
society.  The iteration and interpretation of norms and of every aspect of the universe of value, 
however, is never merely an act of repetition.53  Every act of iteration involves making sense of an 
‘authoritative original’ in a new and different context through interpretation.  The antecedent thereby 
is reposited and resignified via subsequent usages and references.  Meaning is enhanced and 
transformed; conversely, when the creative appropriation of that authoritative original ceases or stops 
making sense, then the original loses its authority upon us as well. 
Democratic citizens reinterpret and reappropriate human rights principles to give them shape 
as constitutional rights, thus suffusing constitutional rights with new content.  Nor is it to be precluded 
that such constitutional iterations may themselves provide feed-back loops in rendering more precise 
the intent and language of international human rights declarations and treaties.   Such processes of 
democratic iteration at their best produce a messy awareness of the difficulties as well as attractions of 
world-citizenship. It is only by suffusing the universalist promise of human rights with concrete moral 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Right to Democracy? Beyond Interventionism and Indifference,” in: Philosophical Dimensions of Human Rights. Some 
Contemporary Views, ed. by Claudio Corradetti (New York: Springer, 2011), pp. 190-213. 
52 I owe this formulation to Habermas’s thesis of the cooriginality of public and private autonomy. See J. Habermas, Between 
Facts and Norms, pp. 84-104.  The final sentence refers, of course, to Kant’s famous formula that “Thoughts without 
concepts are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, unabridged  edn., 
trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1965), p. 93. Although I am indebted to Habermas’s 
general discussions of the relationship between public and private autonomy and his analysis of the discursive 
legitimation of law, I do not follow his “discourse-theoretic deduction of basic rights.”   See my review of Habermas’s 
Between Facts and Norms in: 9 American Political Science Review 3 (1997), pp. 725-26.   
53 Cf. Jacques Derrida, “Signature Event Context.” In: Limited, Inc. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1988). 
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and political struggles in concrete contexts that visions of cosmopolitan citizenship and global 
subjectivities can develop.54 
            Democratic iterations occur throughout civil society and the public sphere in diverse sites. In 
constitutional democracies, the courts are the primary authoritative sites of norm iteration through 
judicial interpretation.  But the interaction between domestic and binding transnational norms can take 
place outside courts, through the contributions of organizations such as NGOs, INGOs, Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch. These organizations produce expert reports as well as 
mobilizing public opinion around both rights-interpretations and rights-violations, thus entering the 
iterative conversation.  A third site of iteration emerges through the interaction of judicial and 
transnational sources of rights-interpretation with the beliefs and opinions of ordinary citizens 
concerning their rights and those of others.  In formulating the concept of democratic iterations in 
earlier works, it is this latter process that I had most in mind, and in section 6 below I would like to 
expand my concept to encompass these other sites of iteration as well.  
Before doing so though, let me consider the objection: if democratic iterations are necessary in 
order for us to judge the legitimacy of a range of variation in the interpretation of a right claim, how 
can we assess whether democratic iterations have taken place rather than demagogic processes of 
manipulation or authoritarian indoctrination?  Do not democratic iterations themselves presuppose 
some standards of rights to be properly evaluated? Furthermore, aren’t democratic iterations 
conceding too much to, or may be even idealizing, democratic processes that are inevitably messy, 
often ill-informed, and more significantly, which may result in the trampling of the rights of unwanted 
others and minorities?  
My model seems to conflate liberal protections of rights with a majoritarian democratic 
conversation. As we know, this relationship is one of the most significant and fraught throughout the 
history of modern political thought.  I am very much aware of this and yet insist on the necessary 
interaction between the liberal-discourse of rights-protection and the democratic processes of opinion-
and-will-formation.  Democratic iterations are not merely populist politics but have some formal 
discourse conditions built into them that would exclude the most egregious rights-violations.  
Democratic legitimacy reaches back to principles of normative justification.  Democratic 
iterations do not alter the conditions of validity of moral discourses of justification that are established 
independently of them. Very briefly, such discourses stipulate several formal-procedural criteria: all 
those whose interests are affected by the adoption of a specific norm have the right to participate in 
discourses through which such norms are to be adopted.  First then is a condition of equal 
                                                     
54 I have discussed in more detail the role of global social movements in claiming rights across borders and generating 
cosmopolitan citizenship in: S Benhabib, “Claiming Rights Across Borders: International Human Rights and Democratic 
Sovereignty,” Dignity in Adversity. Human Rights in Troubled Times, p. 117-138; originally published in: 103 American 
Political Science Review 4 (November 2009), pp. 691-704. 
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participation of all affected. Second is the right of all discourse participants to an equal say in such 
conversations. Third is the right of all participants to challenge the rules of agenda setting, and fourth 
is the right of participants to engage in meta-discourses about the procedures for framing discourses.  
As is well-known, this discourse model of justification, much like John Rawls’s model of the two 
principles of justice, is a counter-factual one.  It leads us to judge as legitimate or illegitimate, in a 
preliminary and formal sense, processes of opinion- and will-formation through which rights claims 
are contested and contextualized, expanded and debated, in actual institutions of civil and political 
society.  Such criteria minimally distinguish a de facto consensus from a rationally motivated one.  
Such criteria are not guidelines for building institutions, any more than Rawls’s second principle of 
justice – the difference principle – tells us how to organize the economy!  They are counterfactual 
criteria which can lead  participants to challenge the legitimacy of a decision reached and a norm that 
is advocated.  They provide moral agents with a “veto power,” if you wish. 
Some will note that there may be some kind of circularity here: I am talking about the right of 
participants to equal say, agenda-setting, etc., and you will say, but “weren’t these norms supposed to 
result from a practical discourse in the first place”?  The answer to this objection is twofold: since 
Aristotle, we know that in reasoning about matters of ethics and politics, we are “always already 
situated” in medias res – we never begin the conversation without some presupposition, and in this 
case, without some shared understanding of what equality of participation in the conversation, 
challenging the agenda, and the like, may mean.  Discourses are then reflexive processes through 
which much of what we always already take for granted is challenged, questioned, and their validity is 
“bracketed,”  until these presuppositions are reestablished at the end of the conversation – a 
conversation which itself is always open to a future challenge.   
This hermeneutic model of iteration is a recursive one, based on the same principles of non-
foundationalism recently articulated by Neil Walker.  There is an empirical and a normative 
incompleteness to the rules that frame the discourses themselves,55 which then need to be reposited 
and rearticulated through the conversation.  This recursive model of justification, based on the force of 
iterations, is related to many discussions in contemporary epistemology as well.   
In the next section, I will consider three normative models for conceptualizing the epistemic 
and political dialogue around rights concepts, as they take place both within and across democracies.  
                                                     
55 Neil Walker, “Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: An Iterative Relationship,” 39 Rechtsfilosofie & 
Rechtstheorie 3 (2010), pp. 206-233; N. Walker, “Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy. A  Reply to 
Four Critics,” Ibid., pp. 276-288; N. Walker, “Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness of Democracy: State and 
Global,” Paper presented at the NYU Faculty Colloquium and on file with the author.  Walker is discussing democracy in 
these articles and not rules of discourse per se, but rules of discourse are the most abstract norms that undergird 
democratic practices, and the principle of “incompleteness” holds for both.  While not accepting the prospect “of 
postnational constitutionalism without democracy,” Walker shows the inadequacy of the  sovereign nation-centric model 
discussed above by elucidating how constitutionalism and democracy define and ‘complete’ each other. 
(“Constitutionalism and the Incompleteness Democracy: An Iterative Relationship,” pp. 228 ff.) 
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These three models develop modalities of thinking beyond the binarism of the cosmopolitan versus the 
civic republican; democratic versus the international and transnational; democratic sovereignty versus 
human rights law.   
 
6. Human Rights and the Legitimacy of the International Order 
The arguments presented above are greatly supported by an article of Allen Buchanan’s.56  Although 
Buchanan does not use the concept of ‘democratic iterations’ or the ‘discourse theory of legitimacy,’ 
many of his formulations are consistent with both and expand them in helpful ways.  Buchanan begins 
with the observation that “The more seriously the international legal system takes the protection of 
human rights and the more teeth the commitment has, the more problematic the lack of a credible 
public justification for human rights norms becomes.”57  He then spells out what such a ‘public 
justification’ process would entail: specifying and justifying human-rights norms should be understood 
as “a matter of ongoing mutual adjustment between our provisional core conception of human rights, 
our standards for the epistemic performance of the institutions that articulate human rights-norms, and 
our judgments about the existence and content of particular human rights.”58  Buchanan’s real 
innovative move is to claim that a specific justification of human rights can only be evaluated, if, in 
addition the philosophical articulation of a concept of human rights, formulated in the light of major 
human rights documents and treaties, we  focus on “the epistemic virtues of institutions through which 
the norms are specified, contested and revised over time.”59   
Buchanan’s concept of ‘epistemic virtue’ is enormously helpful to unpack my concept of 
‘democratic iterations.’ Given that human-rights norms are necessarily abstract, they need 
contextualization and specification. But to avoid the parochialism and a free-for-all pluralism that may 
result from such contextualization, we need institutional processes of a certain epistemic quality.  First 
and foremost, we should note that the legal translations of human-rights norms are not mere 
mechanical applications of moral norms but that they constitute “modes of public practical reasoning 
that contribute to our understanding of moral rights [I would add as well as legal ones SB] and to their 
justification.”60  Epistemic virtue in these matters then entails concretizing and specifying the content 
of such rights through “modes of public practical reasoning” which are themselves publicly accessible 
and justifiable.  
What might such public practical reasoning involve? Beyond the transmission and utilization 
of correct factual information that may bear on such reasoning, “institutions that contribute to the 
                                                     
56 Allen Buchanan, “Human Rights and the Legitimacy of the International Order,” Legal Theory, 14 (2008), pp. 39-70. 
57 Ibid., p. 41. 
58 Ibid., p. 66, emphasis in the original text. 
59 Ibid., p. 39. 
60 Ibid., p. 48. 
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articulation of human-rights norms ought to provide venues for deliberation in which the authority of 
good reasons is recognized, in which credible efforts are made to reduce the risk that strategic 
bargaining or raw power will displace rational deliberation, in which principled contestation of 
alternative views is encouraged, in which no points of view are excluded  on the basis of prejudicial 
attitudes toward those who voice them ...”61  
Such epistemic virtues are the virtues of a democratic public sphere and of deliberative sites in 
the judiciary, civil society, and political representative institutions that interact with the democratic 
public sphere.  Since the contextualization of human rights norms entails such processes of public 
practical reason, and since states cannot simply hide behind the shield of sovereignty, what we are 
looking at is a transnational conversation of practical reason(s) that toggle(s) back and forth between 
moral and the legal concepts of human rights and their supporting arguments.  I don’t think that this 
transnational conversation amounts to global constitutionalism, but global constitutionalism can only 
emerge, if at all, in and through such iterations, conversations, and contestations. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter has called such dialogues among courts “transjudicial 
communication.”62 The courts around the world recognize that a global set of human rights issues are 
to be adjudicated upon in “colloquy with one another.”  “Such recognition,” she writes, “flows from 
the ideology of universal human rights …The premise of universalism, however, does not anoint any 
one tribunal with universal authority to interpret and apply these rights. Collective judicial 
deliberation, through awareness, acknowledgment, and use of decisions rendered by fellow human 
rights tribunals, frames a universal process of judicial deliberation and decision.”63 
Anne-Marie Slaughter has been an enthusiastic and most able advocate of “the new world 
order” of global constitutionalism and judicial internationalism.  Even if we may not share in her 
political optimism about these processes, she is undoubtedly correct in calling our attention to the 
emergent world of ‘transjudicial communication.’  What I am trying to suggest is that such processes 
of ‘transjudicial communication’ can be seen as forms of practical reasoning as well, insofar as they 
involve practices of reason-giving, deliberation and reasoned argumentation. 
                                                     
61 Ibid., p. 62. Note that Allen Buchanan’s criteria of the epistemic virtue of institutions are, like those of the discourse-
theoretic approach I defend, also formal-procedural ones.  One needs to emphasize though that such criteria provide 
necessary but not sufficient conditions of the exercise of practical reason. Criteria as well as procedures require 
interpretation; and here critical judgment has a role to play.  Practical reason involves both ‘determinative’ and 
‘reflective’ judgment in the Kantian sense.  For my early analysis of these issues, see “Judgment and the Moral 
Foundations of Politics in Hannah Arendt’s Thought,”  in: S. Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt 
( CA: Sage Publications, 1996; expanded edition : New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 173-193.  For some 
recent work on the problem of judgment, see Alessandro Ferrara, The Force of the Example (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008)  and Albena Azmanova, The Scandal of Reason. A Critical Theory of Political Judgment (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
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What about the skeptic’s point then that this typology of transjudicial communication flies in 
the face of states’ practice of placing RUD’s – reservations, understandings and declarations – on 
human rights treaties such as to blunt their import and shield their own practices of non-compliance? 
As Judith Resnik has observed, treaty ratification processes now no longer center upon “a singular 
formal moment of ratification through a monovocal nation-state.”64 Increasingly, cities, states, 
counties, municipalities are themselves incorporating major human rights treaties into their own 
charters. The city of San Francisco has adopted CEDAW, just as San Paolo (Brazil) has; Portland, 
Oregon has incorporated the UDHR into its charter.65  Such processes of legal seepage at sites below 
the centralized judicial authority of the state testify to the ‘disaggregation’ processes of the national 
that Saskia Sassen is also concerned with.   However, one cannot naively assume that all ‘local 
iterations’ enhance democratic processes and values; they do not.  Nevertheless, such affiliations 
multiply the sites at which transjudicial conversations can occur, and show how even in the face of 
national recalcitrance and resistance to some human rights organs such as CEDAW, for example, a 
human rights discourse across national and local boundaries can take place. 
Judith Resnik’s contribution is to suggest that RUD’s themselves can be viewed in analogy to 
doctrines such as “margin of appreciation” or types of legal pluralism permitted by a variety of 
federalist arrangements (vide India’s Muslim Family Law).  Yet whereas the local and regional 
incorporation of rights treaties suggest their expansion across borders, these other processes may point 
to the limiting and blunting of their normative reach.  Resnik observes that “…wholesale criticism of 
the practice undervalues CEDAW’s contribution to a political economy in which a formal 
commitment to women’s equality is seen to confer capital.  What is intriguing about CEDAW is the 
decision by many inegalitarian political orders to state – albeit with RUDs – that their versions of legal 
structures fit within a women’s rights template …   [M]oreover, RUDs are not necessarily static; they 
can provide a means of beginning conversations about treaty obligations.”66  Resnik cites how 
Bangladesh in 1997 withdrew reservations to CEDAW which were earlier based on “the conflict 
between Sharia law” and the Convention; Jordan withdrew a similar objection to a woman’s right to 
independent residence and domicile other than that of her husband in 2009. Sex-based differences in 
the military had led countries such as Australia, Austria, Germany, New Zealand, Switzerland and 
Thailand to place reservations on CEDAW, many of which have since then withdrawn their caveats. 
Resnik is not oblivious either to the limiting effect of RUDs nor to the potentially 
opportunistic uses made of the doctrine of “margin of appreciation” by European Courts.  Yet she sees 
“these models of mediated participation,” as offering a “cosmo-political” vision to “capture the idea of 
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polities joining in commitments that both acknowledge[d] their independent identities while imposing 
reciprocal obligations.”67 
 
7. Conclusion 
As this final discussion indicates, whether we emphasize the ‘epistemic virtues’ of practical reason at 
work in the deliberative institutions of a democratic society (Buchanan), the transjudicial 
conversations of judges (Anne-Marie Slaughter), or law’s affiliations through de-centering the nation-
state paradigm and the ‘heterogeneity of transnational law production’ (Resnik), transnational treaties, 
practices and institutions are seen to enhance rather than diminish democratic deliberation and rights 
discourse. 
While not sharing the skepticism of realist state-theorists, I am also unable to share in the 
enthusiasm of contemporary global constitutionalists.  It is within bounded polities (which may or may 
not be nation-states – they can be multiethnic or multicultural democracies, binational federations, or 
constitutional post-national polities such as the EU) – that democratic iterations can occur. These 
boundaries are porous, permeable and active sites of transnational as well as national democratic 
conversations and iterations.  It is this radical fact of interdependence and transnational affiliation that 
contemporary legal cosmopolitanism seeks to elucidate. Such radical interdependence and 
transnational affiliations raise the ‘threshold of justification’68 for the interpretation, concretization, as 
well as limitation, of rights in the process of their constitutionalization by national legislatures and 
judiciaries, thus contributing to enhance the quality of democratic discourse and democratic practice. 
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